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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE
RESOURCE CURSE
Patrick J. Keenan*
INTRODUCTION
Determining why some countries have prospered and others
have failed to grow has puzzled scholars and policymakers for
decades and remains an important question to the millions of people
in the developing world. A particularly vexing part of the problem
has to do with countries that are rich in exploitable natural resources
like oil, natural gas, or minerals. These countries have tended to grow
more slowly than countries without similar resources. This
phenomenon, often called the resource curse, has been the focus of
sustained attention by scholars from many disciplines who have
attempted to identify whether, how, and why the resource curse
exists and how it might be reversed or ameliorated. To a poor
country, a source of sustained revenue can look like free money: the
country simply needs to extract the resource from the ground and sell
it, which should cause the country grow more quickly and fare better
than countries without similar resources. In too many places, reality
has proven far different.1 But resource wealth does not inevitably
* Patrick Keenan, Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of
Law.
For a thorough discussion of the literature on the resource curse, see
Michael L. Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 51 WORLD POL. 297
(1999). Ross reviews the literature and concludes that there “is now strong evidence
that states with abundant resource wealth perform less well than their resourcepoor counterparts, but there is little agreement on why this occurs.” Id. at 297. Two
relatively early books remain important for their discussion of individual countries
and the lessons they draw from these case studies. For discussion of the relative
importance of mineral endowments and their often-negative effects on
macroeconomic performance, see RICHARD M. AUTY, SUSTAINING
DEVELOPMENT IN MINERAL ECONOMIES: THE RESOURCE CURSE THESIS (1993).
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cause harm. There are certainly success stories of countries that have
turned resource wealth into sustained economic development.2 What
explains the difference in outcomes?
Determining the effect of a country’s resource wealth on its
economic development is an important strand of development
scholarship. As scholars have considered the effect of resource
wealth, it has become clear that institutions are a principal factor in
determining whether a country develops quickly or slowly (or at all). 3
Some scholars go so far as to argue that “institutions rule” with
respect to economic development;4 that is, that institutions are the
most important factor in general and with respect to states rich in
natural resources.5 For my purposes, it is not necessary to argue or to
prove that institutions are the principal determinant of economic
Auty examines in detail six highly resource-dependent countries and finds that
resource wealth can have a negative effect on growth under particular policy
conditions. Terry Lynn Karl, in the book THE PARADOX OF PLENTY: OIL BOOMS
AND PETRO-STATES (Stephen D. Krasner et al. eds., 1997), finds similar results in
countries dependent on the sale of oil, albeit for somewhat different reasons.
2 See, e.g., Ragnar Torvik, Why Do Some Resource-Abundant Countries Succeed
While Others Do Not?, 25 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 241, 245-46 (2009)
(comparing resource-rich countries which have not been affected by the resource
curse to those which have).
3 See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The
Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7771, 2000) (arguing “that differences in
institutions account for roughly three-quarters of the differences in income per
capita” in former colonies). For an accessible and comprehensive analysis of
economic development scholarship and history, see DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES
A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND
POVERTY (2012). Acemoglu and Robinson consider both individual cases and
large-n econometric analyses to conclude that countries “differ in their economic
success because of their different institutions, the rules influencing how the
economy works, and the incentives that motivate people.” Id. at 73.
4 Dani Rodrik et al., Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography
and Integration in Economic Development (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 9305, 2002) (finding that the quality of institutions is the principal
determinant of a country’s income, more important than geography—which
includes resource endowment—and market integration).
5 A recent study by Jeffrey A. Frankel, The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15836, 2010) confirms earlier
conclusions and, based on a review of recent literature, identifies institutions as the
most important factor.
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growth to the exclusion of other factors.6 Instead, I argue that
institutions are important and warrant critical analysis.
In countries with robust and well-functioning institutions,
there is ample evidence that it is possible to turn the revenue flowing
from the exploitation of natural resources into lasting economic and
social development.7 In countries whose institutions function less
well, the presence of resource wealth either does not help as much as
would be expected or even harms the country’s prospects for
development. Although there is still considerable debate about which
institutions are most important and why, there is no longer much
6 There are, of course, other factors that affect economic development.
For example, there are many scholars who argue that geography plays a significant
role in determining a country’s economic development, perhaps the most
important role. For example, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Paul Collier, and their co-authors
argue that at “the root of Africa’s poverty lies its extraordinarily disadvantageous
geography, which has helped to shape its societies and its interactions with the rest
of the world.” David E. Bloom et al., Geography, Demography, and Economic Growth in
Africa, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 207, 211 (1998). See also John
Luke Gallup et al., Geography and Economic Development, 22 INT’L REG’L SCI. REV.
179, 194 (1999) (showing empirical linkages between geographic factors, such as
transport costs and intrinsic productivity and long-term economic growth). As
might be expected, there has long been robust debate between the geography-first
camp and the institutions rule camp and which factor is most important. Compare
Rodrik et al., supra note 4, at 4 (arguing that “the quality of institutions trumps
everything else”), with Bloom et al., supra note 6 (arguing that geography
predominates and about how to determine which factor is most important). See, e.g.,
Edward L. Glaeser et al., Do Institutions Cause Growth?, 9 J. ECON. GROWTH 271,
296-98 (2004) (arguing that “the existing research strategy” has not proven the link
“between institutions and economic growth”). See generally Simeon Djankov et al.,
The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 595 (2003) (considering the
connections between geography, institutions, and growth in the context of a
number of other relevant causal factors). It is not my objective to determine which
single factor is the most important in determining economic development. It is
enough to show, as the evidence clearly does, that institutions are vitally important
and do affect economic development in general and in the context of resource-rich
economies.
7 For a discussion of various policy interventions to address the resource
curse, see ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE (Macartan Humphreys et al. eds.,
2007). The book’s contributing authors consider policies to address the political
and economic components of the resource curse and draw on success stories to
demonstrate that it is possible to transform resource wealth into sustained
economic development.
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debate that institutions are central to the problem of development in
general and to the effect of resource wealth on development in
particular.8
To this point, the scholarship on economic development and
the exploitation of natural resources has arrived at a rough consensus
on two issues. The first is that the resource curse is a demonstrable
phenomenon, and the second is that weak institutions are an
important causal factor. Having verified that the symptoms are real
and identified some of their causes, the next step is to arrive at a
viable course of treatment.
The principal contribution of this Article is to show that, in
many cases, international institutions—as opposed to domestic
institutions—are promising mechanisms by which to address the
problem. This argument is both an attempt to push the scholarly
conversation forward by moving from a cause to treatment and to
offer a corrective to a common problem in the policy literature. Most
policymakers have focused almost entirely on the reform of domestic
institutions as the way to address the problems associated with the
resource curse. Given the trajectory of development scholarship, it is
unsurprising that scholars and policymakers have focused primarily
on domestic institutions. The scholarship on the causes of the
resource curse has identified domestic institutional failures as a
principal driver of the resource curse. Scholars argue that the failures
of domestic institutions cause the resource curse and that fixing
domestic institutions is the best way to address the problem. I argue
that it is a mistake to assume that because domestic institutional
failures are the principal cause of the problem, their reform should be
the principal focus of policymakers. In many instances, the
weaknesses of domestic institutions are self-perpetuating, and
focusing on them can amount to either a missed opportunity or
actually contribute to harm. Instead, I argue that international
8 See, e.g., Halvor Mehlum et al., Institutions and the Resource Curse, 116
ECON. J. 1 (2006) (finding that institutions are key to determining the economic
success of resource rich countries); Ivar Kolstad, The Resource Curse: Which Institutions
Matter?, 16 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 439 (2009) (arguing that private sector
institutions are more important than public sector institutions with respect to the
resource curse).
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institutions, even if they are not a principal cause of the problem, can
be a viable second-best solution. Indeed, given the state of domestic
institutions in many resource-rich developing countries, international
institutions may represent the most plausible mechanism by which to
address the problem.
The Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I review the
relevant literature on the resource curse and the role of institutions in
economic development. There are two principal schools of thought
within the institutions literature. One approach holds that the most
important institutions are those that affect the choices faced by
people and firms in the private sector. These scholars argue that
countries prosper when institutions push entrepreneurs to pursue
productive activity instead seeking to garner a greater share of the
rents from existing commercial activity. The second approach holds
that institutions that affect the behavior of political leaders matter
most because they determine how resource revenue is distributed and
the extent to which leaders are accountable to citizens. I do not
attempt to resolve this debate. Instead, I show that both explanations
are plausible, and, more importantly, that my argument works
regardless of which approach is the more accurate.
In Part II, I show the various kinds of institutional failures
that are associated with poor economic growth; that is, what it is that
institutions do or fail to do that contributes to growth or stagnation.
These failures come in many forms, of course, but I focus on two
clusters of problems. First, in many states, weak domestic institutions
permit public officials to play dual roles in resource revenue
decisions. In their official roles, they make commercial decisions on
behalf of the state, and, in their private capacities, they serve as
shareholders or principals in companies that do business with the
state on the same projects over which they have official control.
Officials are thus policymakers and private actors in the same
transaction. This permits officials to personally enrich themselves and
their families. Second, the domestic institutions of many resourcerich states are weak enough to permit public officials to distribute
resource revenue in ways that benefit themselves or their political
allies but do not contribute to the state’s long-term growth or
improve the lives of citizens. This revenue distribution problem takes
many forms, but, at its core, it is about how public officials choose to
220
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use the revenue that comes from the sale of what are, after all, assets
owned by the state.
In Part III, I identify the international institutions that either
help or could help to ameliorate the resource curse in resource-rich
countries under the right conditions. These institutions do the work
of constraining the choices or influencing the behavior of the
relevant public and private actors involved in the exploitation of
natural resources. In this part I have two principal goals, one
doctrinal and one theoretical. The doctrinal goal is to demonstrate
that my approach is plausible and could succeed by specifying the
legal or institutional mechanisms that could serve as substitutes for
functioning domestic institutions. These include tools to place limits
on the ability of officials to play dual roles, force the disclosure of
relevant information to citizens or others, and reduce the incentives
that officials have to use resource revenue in self-serving or
inefficient ways. The theoretical goal is to anticipate and respond to
potential objections to my approach. The strongest of these
objections is that it is an affront to the sovereignty of developing
states to use international institutions to accomplish what should be
core domestic functions. Nonetheless, because international
institutions are already involved in resource extraction transactions,
their use as substitutes for failing domestic institutions is appropriate.
I. THE RESOURCE CURSE AND INSTITUTIONS
In this Part, I address two principal issues: what is the
resource curse and how does it affect poor countries, and what role
do institutions play in economic development, particularly with
respect to resource-rich states. First, scholars have long worked to
determine the factors that contribute economic development,
including attempting to determine how the presence of exploitable
natural resources affects a country’s development prospects. Some
countries have used the revenues from resources to expand their
economies and become solidly developed (or begin on a clear path
toward development). Others appear to have foundered despite
influxes of wealth from resources.
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The second objective of this Part is to identify what
institutions actually do in the context of natural resource
development. What do institutions provide to a country, or from
what do they protect it? Do they educate people so they can
participate in governance or economic activity? Do they protect the
country from avaricious bankers or politicians? Do they protect the
country from elites attempting to dominate the economy? Because
almost anything could be an institution when considered at a
sufficiently general level—political parties, social clubs, the criminal
law—I first specify that I mean those entities and regulations that
shape political and economic behavior with respect to natural
resources. I argue that institutions provide successful states with a
cluster of essential goods and that when these goods are not
provided, states struggle to develop in the first place or to sustain
gains made under different conditions.
A. The Resource Curse
Countries rich in natural resources grow more slowly than
similar countries without the resources.9 For years, development
economists argued that resource endowments were critical to the
long-term economic development of countries.10 Countries that had
been blessed with more natural resources were expected to develop
more quickly than states not similarly blessed. Then scholars began to
note an anomaly: some countries that should have prospered if the
conventional wisdom were true were in fact floundering. What was
sometimes called “the paradox of plenty” was the finding that more
wealth produced less welfare for many people in poor countries.11 In
the policy literature using country studies and analyzing the
There is a vast literature on the resource curse and its causes and
consequences. For a comprehensive survey and analysis of its many strands, see
MICHAEL L. ROSS, THE OIL CURSE: HOW PETROLEUM WEALTH SHAPES THE
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONS (2012). Ross’s book presents the empirical evidence
that resource wealth is associated with slower development and other social ills and
analyzes the various hypotheses for why this is true.
10 See, e.g., AUTY, supra note 1, at 1 (noting the conventional view that
resource abundance was positively associated with economic development).
11 See Karl, supra note 1 (arguing that the oil and commodity booms of
the 1970s and 1980s should have led to development in many poor countries but
did not).
9
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connections between resource abundance and wealth over a relatively
short time frame, scholars demonstrated that resource wealth did not
quickly or inevitably lead to economic development in countries in
which it should have had the extant theories been valid.12 Later, in
econometric analyses of many more countries over a longer time
period, scholars began to demonstrate the full extent of the problem.
Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, in a now-famous article,
showed that there is a “statistically significant, inverse, and robust
association between natural resource intensity and growth.”13 Sachs
and Warner examined the growth rates of 97 resource-dependent
countries and found that, even after controlling for other variables,
growth was slower, on average, in more heavily resource-dependent
states than in states less dependent on resource wealth.14
Since the path-breaking work of Sachs and Warner and
others, scholars have identified a number of other problems that
appear more likely in resource-dependent countries than in countries
less dependent on resources: there is a higher likelihood of conflict,15
there is more official corruption,16 corrupt rulers stay in power
longer,17 and there is a greater likelihood of a misallocation of
12 See, e.g., ALAN GELB, OIL WINDFALLS: BLESSING OR CURSE? (1988)
(assessing the success or failure of oil exporting countries Algeria, Ecuador,
Indonesia, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela during the oil boom of
the 1970s).
13 Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and
Economic Growth 21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5398,
1995).
14 Id. at 2 (comparing “each country’s annual growth rate between 1970
and 1989 in relation to the country’s natural resource-based exports in 1970,
measured as a percent of GDP.”).
15 See generally Silje Aslaksen & Ragnar Torvik, A Theory of Civil Conflict and
Democracy in Rentier States, 108 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 571, 584 (2006) (presenting
empirical results showing that greater “resource wealth increases the expected
payoff from both elections and conflict”).
16 Aaron Tornell & Phillip R. Lane, The Voracity Effect, 89 AM. ECON.
REV. 22, 23 (1999). Tornell and Lane argue that where political and legal
institutions are weak, unconditioned wealth can produce “a more-thanproportional increase in redistribution” of wealth from resource rents. Id. at 42.
17 See Benjamin Smith, Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing
World, 1960-1999, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 232, 238 (2004) (finding that “[o]il
dependence is a positive predictor of durability, but at the same time is negatively
related to democracy, another positive predictor”).
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resources.18 To be sure, these ills are not unique to resourcedependent countries, and there is no evidence that resource
abundance is the sole cause of all of these problems. Regardless, the
finding that resource-dependent countries fared worse than similarly
constituted countries without the blessing of resource wealth is
robust. Once scholars had demonstrated that the problem exists, the
next issue was to determine why this was so. In the following parts, I
address this question. First I review the literature on institutions and
their role in economic development. Then I address the relationship
between institutions and the resource curse.
B. Institutions and Development
Institutions are the controls by which individuals and
societies regulate themselves. They shape the incentives faced by a
politician who must choose between enriching himself at the public’s
expense and investing in his nation. They guide a bright young
graduate who must choose between developing a productive new
business and seeking a way to reap more for herself from an existing
enterprise.19 In recent decades, scholars of various disciplines have
studied the role of institutions in economic development,20 and have
tested their theories empirically.21 In this Part, I lay out what I mean
by institutions and discuss what institutions do for societies,
particularly those institutions most relevant to economic
development.
I use a definition of institutions adopted largely from the
work of Douglass North. Institutions are the agreed-upon rules that
See, e.g., James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, White Elephants, 89 J.
PUB. ECON. 197, 198 (2005) (describing decisions by the government of Zambia to
place manufacturing plants in locations that would ensure support from voters
even though the locations were not served by reliable transportation networks and
alternative locations were available).
19 See generally MATTHEW BISHOP, ESSENTIAL ECONOMICS (2004);
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990); ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL
DIVERSITY (2005).
20 See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic Development?
Evidence from East Asia, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 829, 830 (2000).
21 See, e.g., Rodrik et al., supra note 4.
18
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people use to structure their interactions.22 Included in this are formal
rules, such as laws or regulations, explicitly created to facilitate
exchange.23 Also included are non-formal “codes of conduct that
underlie and supplement formal rules.”24 This definition is sufficiently
broad as to accommodate constraints, rules, and incentives for all
manners of human interaction. Indeed, Nobel-prize winning political
scientist Elinor Ostrom, in her work on institutions, argues that
institutions organize interactions “within families, neighborhoods,
markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, private associations, and
governments at all scales.”25
In addition to comprising the rules or processes by which
interactions are governed, my definition of institution necessarily
implicates the structures through which those rules are made and
enforced. By this I mean that institutions include both the rules of
the game and the mechanisms by which those rules are developed,
contested, and enforced. In this way, my conception of institutions is
consistent with that of Robert Keohane, for whom institutions
include the rules of the game and the “formal organizations” in
which these rules find expression.26 An important implication of my
conception of institutions is that it accounts for the way interactions
actually occur in international (and domestic) affairs: there is constant
negotiation and re-negotiation of the rules of the game, which is
affected by and affects the organizations in which the negotiations
take place.
A second implication of my conception of institutions is that
it accounts for the ways that the rules of the game affect those
involved in the game. This problem is necessarily and inevitably
contingent on the actors involved, the kinds of rules in place, and the
issues at stake. For my purposes, the most convincing account of
enforcement comes from Andrew Guzman’s work on international

22 NORTH, supra note 19, at 4 (“Institutions include any form of
constraint that human beings devise to shape human interaction.”).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 OSTROM, supra note 19, at 4.
26 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT’L
STUD. Q. 379, 384 (1988).
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law.27 Guzman argues that what matters is to identify, to the extent
possible, how international law—the immediate focus of his
attention— “changes the behavior of states.”28 My focus is therefore
not on enforcement, that is, specifying the precise mechanism by
which a particular rule is imposed on actors. Instead, my focus is on
the ways that institutions might influence the behavior of states and
other actors.
At this level of generality, institutions could be almost
anything, and it is not my objective to develop a positive theory of
institutions. Instead, I focus on a subset of institutions that are most
relevant to economic development, particularly in resource-abundant
countries. The problem is significantly more complicated in
developing countries with exploitable natural resources. But, at its
core, the phenomenon is the same: how to mediate among
competing desires to achieve the best outcome. Institutions play the
role of self-control. They channel the incentives faced by disparate
actors, each of whom might have different objectives and desires.
In the view of Douglass North, institutions are the principal
determinant of economic growth.29 Dani Rodrik and his co-authors
argue that institutional quality does more to explain economic
development than the other available hypotheses.30 One need not go
that far, of course, to conclude that institutions are critically
important. For my purposes it is enough to conclude, in the words of
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, that dysfunctional
institutions “keep poor countries poor and prevent them from
embarking on a path to economic growth.”31

See generally ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW
WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008).
28 Id. at 22.
29 NORTH, supra note 19, at 107 (arguing that institutions “are the
underlying determinant of the long-run performance of economies”).
30 Rodrik et al., supra note 4, at 5 (arguing, based on econometric analysis,
that “institutional quality emerges as the clear winner of the ‘horse race’” among
geography, integration, and institutions in determining economic development).
31 ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 398. But cf. Ha-Joon Chang,
Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History, 7 J. INST’L. ECON. 473,
475-77 (Oct. 2010) (arguing that scholars have paid insufficient attention to
27
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The more difficult task is to identify which institutions are
most important and the work those institutions do to help or harm a
country. Of greatest interest to scholars concerned with economic
development is that subset of institutions that regulate economic and
political activity. In states that benefit from the presence of natural
resources, there are institutions that mediate citizen and state
interactions with respect to commercial activity and the development
of state or public resources and that provide points of access for
citizens to assert their values and hold their leaders accountable. The
failure of such institutions can undermine a state’s opportunity for
economic development. Even more important, the failure of such
institutions can lead to increased human suffering, exploitation, or
degradation. When people have few legitimate opportunities to
influence their governments, they suffer.
C. The Work Institutions Do
Not every resource-rich country fails to develop, and scholars
have attempted to identify what factors must be present in addition
to resource abundance to lead to the problems described above.32
Increasingly, scholars have identified dysfunctional institutions as a
principal cause of the resource curse because of the role institutions
play, or fail to play, in society.33 What is more difficult is to identify
causality in determining whether institutional quality causes economic or whether
economic development causes institutions to improve).
32 See, e.g., Torvik, supra note 2 (reviewing empirical literature on the
existence of the resource curse and theoretical literature on explanations for its
presence or absence).
33 There is a robust literature on the causes of the resource curse. The
first set of scholarly explanations addresses the effects of resource booms on
exchange rates and non-resource sectors of the economy. See, e.g., PAUL COLLIER,
THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND WHAT
CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 39-40 (2007) (reviewing the macroeconomic arguments
for the resource curse); Michael Bruno & Jeffrey Sachs, Energy and Resource
Allocation: A Dynamic Model of the “Dutch Disease,” 49 REV. ECON. STUD. 845, 846
(1982) (describing the effects of resource booms on various sectors of the
economy). Later studies concluded that, in most cases, there was scant empirical
support for these explanations. See Erwin H. Bulte et al., Resource Intensity, Institutions,
and Development, 33 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 1029, 1030 (2005) (reviewing the
literature and concluding that there “is little empirical support for the Dutch
disease as an explanation for the resource curse”). More recently, scholarly
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those features of institutions that do the important work. Scholars of
the roles of institutions argue that at their most basic, institutions
operate as ways to allocate power, whether political, social, or
economic.34 That is, institutions provide the rules and the forum by
which actors seek, keep, and contest power. For my purposes, what
matters is not to develop a full, positive theory of all that institutions
do. Instead, my goal is to show the ways that institutions affect
economic outcomes in the presence of resource wealth.
What are the institutional failures that most contribute to the
negative effect of resource wealth? Institutions come in all types, but
two main types of institutions are relevant to the use or misuse of
resource wealth.35 One set of institutions includes those that
principally affect the private sector. Put simply, private-sector
institutions are those that would affect the decisions an entrepreneur
might make when deciding where to apply her talents and energy: the
protection of property rights, the fair resolution of disputes, and the
like. The second are those that principally affect the public sector.
Public-sector institutions are those that ensure the accountability and
responsiveness of political leaders, including the role of these leaders
in the distribution of resource revenue.
Scholars who attribute more explanatory power to the role of
private institutions posit two states of affairs. In each there is the
presence of valuable and exploitable natural resources. Entrepreneurs
are faced with a choice between productive activities, those that will
grow the pie, and rent-seeking activities, those that allocate to the
entrepreneur a bigger share of the pie without increasing its size. One
leading study terms these institutions “grabber-friendly” and
“producer-friendly” institutions36 and argues that the “combination
explanations of the resource curse have begun to converge around institutions as
the most important variable. See, e.g., Mehlum et al., supra note 8, at 1 (reviewing the
literature and previous studies and concluding that “the dangerous mix of weak
institutions and resource abundance causes the resource curse”).
34 See DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, ECONOMIC ORIGINS
OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY 218 (2006) (arguing that “institutions
influence the allocation of future political power” and provide mechanisms by
which to “lock in” or context political power).
35 Kolstad, supra note 8, at 439-40.
36 Mehlum et al., supra note 8, at 2-3.
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of grabber friendly institutions and resource abundance leads to low
growth,” whereas “[p]roducer friendly institutions” can “help
countries take full advantage of their natural resources.”37 On this
account, the quality of institutions determines the relative appeal of
productive or rent-seeking activities, and entrepreneurs faced with a
choice between the two typically behave rationally and choose the
more profitable route.38 Better institutions lead to more production
and better economic growth because entrepreneurs choose that
route; worse institutions cause entrepreneurs to choose a less
productive path.
Scholars who give more weight to the role of public sector
institutions instead focus on the choices faced by politicians.39 These
scholars argue that “bad economic policies” lead to low growth,40 and
that the bad policies stem from the decisions made by politicians in
resource-rich countries.41 To explain this outcome, these scholars
focus on the role that political institutions play in shaping or
constraining the behavior of politicians. In this model, politicians face
a choice: distribute resource revenue in a way that promotes fair and
long-term development, or distribute revenue in a way that increases
the politician’s chances of staying in power.42 States with institutions
that make it difficult or impossible for the politician to choose the
self-serving distribution of revenue fare better than states whose
institutions permit such distribution.
There is no consensus yet as to which of these two
approaches is the more viable, but there is empirical support favoring
the private sector explanation.43 For my purposes, what matters most
is not to declare a winner but to recognize the vital role institutions
play and to identify those essential functions that might be
approximated by outside institutions. Political institutions constrain
Id. at 16.
Kolstad, supra note 8, at 439.
39 James A. Robinson et al., Political Foundations of the Resource Curse, 79 J.
DEV. ECON. 447, 449 (2006).
40 Id. at 448.
41 Id. at 466.
42 Id.
43 Kolstad, supra note 8, at 441 (arguing that “only private sector
institutions matter empirically”).
37
38
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or embolden politicians, who set policies that can push entrepreneurs
in a productive, pro-growth direction or in an unproductive, growthinhibiting direction. The decisions made by individual entrepreneurs
can either exacerbate existing problems, leading to worse policies and
less accountability, or they can lead to more growth and more
accountability. In the end, once revenue started flowing in many
resource rich countries, the result was a gross mis-deployment of
human capital and public resources because the incentives facing
individuals and leaders were insufficient to push them into
productive work or use of public resources.
II. THE EFFECTS OF WEAK OR DYSFUNCTIONAL INSTITUTIONS
After years of prospecting, oil companies confirmed in 2006
that there were billions of barrels of oil reserves in the ground under
Uganda.44 This prompted the mix of hope and fear that is not
uncommon when oil or other valuable natural resources are
discovered in developing countries. What should be a windfall is now
widely seen as a mixed blessing at best and a curse at worst. When oil
production began in Ghana in 2010, the president felt compelled to
reassure the nation and the international community that he would
“ensure that it becomes a blessing not a curse.”45 Indeed, one leading
pastor in Ghana told the Financial Times that he had prayed that
Ghana would never discover oil because of his fears that oil would
harm the country.46 Citizens and leaders in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe expressed
similar concerns when oil was discovered in their countries. It is no
longer surprising when resource wealth makes a country worse off. In
Josh Kron, Uganda’s Oil Could be Gift that Becomes a Curse, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/26/world/africa/ugandawelcomes-oil-but-fears-graft-it-attracts.html?_r=0.
45 Ghana Enters New Era With Oil Field Launch, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2010,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2a785790-0877-11e0-80d900144feabdc0.html#axzz2mQWSxpZw.
46 William Wallis, Let the Good Times Roll, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2011,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/235d95a2-3972-11e0-97ca00144feabdc0.html#axzz2mQWSxpZw (quoting Pastor Mensa Otabil as stating,
“For years I prayed we would never find oil. I don’t think it will help us to develop
the work ethic we need to structure a viable, productive society. I think people
would most likely become very corrupt because there are no barriers.”).
44
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this Part, I analyze the types of harms done by resource wealth in
countries with weak institutions. It is important to specify the harms
because only by identifying the particular harms is it possible to target
solutions to these harms. Think of these harms as types of cancer:
without knowing the particular type of cancer, it would be difficult
for doctors to select the appropriate medicine to treat the illness most
effectively.
Weak or dysfunctional institutions permit leaders to engage in
all manner of mischief with the wealth they receive from the sale of
natural resources. I argue that this mischief can usefully be divided
into two rough categories: personal enrichment at public expense and
distributing legitimately obtained revenue in ways that are damaging
to the political or economic life of the country. There is, of course,
substantial overlap between the categories, and it is certainly true that
these categories do not represent the sum total of the activity that
contributes to the resource curse. Nonetheless, the categories are
useful for two purposes. First, they help disaggregate types of
behavior to locate more precisely how that behavior is harmful. For
example, the harms that come from investing in wasteful but
politically popular infrastructure projects, like building a grand new
stadium in an impoverished country, are different from the harms
caused when a leader steals revenue that should accrue to the state.
These categories, imperfect as they may be, are helpful for an
additional reason as well. The objective of this Article is to identify
international substitutes that might do some of the work that is
usually performed by domestic institutions. The international
mechanisms available to combat outright theft are different than the
mechanisms available to influence domestic decisions about the
distribution of legitimately-obtained state wealth. Relatedly, the
categories help to anticipate the normative justifications for and
objections to the idea of using international institutions to affect core
domestic functions, such as restricting a country’s ability to determine
how to spend its own money on its own people, and to the particular
mechanisms that I propose.
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A. Personal Enrichment at Public Expense
It is, of course, no longer surprising to learn that leaders of
resource rich countries enrich themselves at the expense of their
citizens.47 The more challenging questions center around how leaders
enrich themselves, how it affects citizens, and what can be done
about it. In many countries the best way to become wealthy is to
either hold political power or be related to someone who does. This
is not, of course, limited to developing countries or to countries of
any particular region of the world. But in places where political
power, or proximity to it, is the exclusive path to wealth, the problem
takes on added importance. How do political leaders enrich
themselves, and why does it matter? There are perhaps as many ways
for autocrats to enrich themselves as there are autocrats, but several
general patterns stand out. What unites these various mechanisms is
that they persist in large measure because of weakened domestic
institutions. In this Part, I outline the ways that autocrats are able to
enrich themselves and the effects of this behavior. The goal of this
Part is not to provide a comprehensive account of corruption or
quasi-corruption. Instead, my goal is to provide the backdrop against
which to argue that weak domestic institutions are subject to gross
exploitation that affects citizens, and that international institutions
might provide a mechanism by which to mitigate these harms.
When the president of a country in which the citizens have
little power to hold their leaders accountable wants to enrich himself,
he has plenty of options. Some autocrats put themselves or their
family members in a position to profit personally from state
endeavors, by, for example, putting their children on the boards of
corporations that profit from business with the state. Others take
handsome signature bonuses, ostensibly legal side payments to state
officials for their signatures on public-private contracts. Others place
family members or close associates in controlling positions in key
industries. This might happen by, for example, requiring that foreign
corporations wishing to extract oil or natural gas enter into joint
ventures with local companies, and then awarding the joint venture
See, e.g., Show Us the Money: Africa, oil and the West, THE ECONOMIST,
Sept. 1, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21561886 (describing widespread
corruption in the oil and gas industries in Africa).
47
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contract to a company owned by their children or close allies. This is
the path of the family of Teodoro Nguema Obiang, the president of
Equatorial Guinea.48 President Obiang’s relatives held official
positions which allowed them impose taxes to benefit themselves and
exploit their connections to the president for their personal benefit.49
Others manipulate domestic regulation to make it difficult to
determine how much revenue is coming in to the state’s treasury.
This is path of the leaders of Angola, who created a financial
structure for the nation’s oil wealth so opaque and convoluted that it
is virtually impossible for outsiders to determine how much has been
stolen from the national treasury.50
None of these paths to enrichment would be as possible
without weakened or dysfunctional domestic institutions. If there
were a rigorous and independent domestic securities regulatory
system, then autocrats would find it much more difficult to engage in
securities manipulation or fraud. A stringent corporate governance
regime would make it more difficult for autocrats to place their
children or cronies in vital positions in joint ventures or other firms
that stand to profit from doing business with the government. An
48 See, e.g., Xan Rice, Mansions, Memorabilia and Personal Log Tax, FIN.
TIMES, June 19, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ca5d3de0-b93b-11e1b4d6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2mQWSxpZw (reporting that Equatorial Guinea’s
president’s son spent approximately $315 million on houses, cars, and memorabilia,
such as Michael Jackson’s white glove, using funds amassed when he served as
Minister of Forests at an official salary of $82,000 per year; he reportedly assessed a
personal tax on every log exported). See also United States v. One White Crystal
Covered Bad Tour Glove & Other Michael Jackson Memorabilia, No. CV 11-3582GW(SSx), 2012 WL 8467453 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2012).
49 See, e.g., Ian Urbina, Taint of Corruption is No Barrier to U.S. Visa, N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
16,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/17/us/17visa.html?pagewanted=all (reporting
connections between President Obiang’s family and the state oil and forestry
industries).
50 See, e.g., Extracting Oil, Burying Data: Energy Companies are Fighting Efforts
to Reveal Payments to Governments, THE ECONOMIST, Feb 23, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21548214 (describing difficulty in determining
how much revenue the government receives from the sale of state oil reserves);
John Reed, Angola Oil Loan Likely to Raise Transparency Issues, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 10,
2005,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a70afe4e-39b4-11da-806e00000e2511c8.html#axzz2mQWSxpZw (reporting on corruption in the financing
of oil production in Angola).
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informed and engaged electorate might operate as a check on
autocrats who wished to sell off vital state assets at below-market
rates under terms that enrich themselves personally.
1.

Public officials and private companies

In most developing countries, oil and other natural resources
are treated as state assets. That is, they belong to the state and can be
sold only by the government.51 Because states are not in the business
of developing oil wells or titanium mines, they typically sell the rights
to exploit natural resources to private companies. The actual
exploitation of the resource is conducted by a complex web of
companies, usually involving one or more private companies, a stateowned company, and multiple subcontractors. This complex
structure results in opportunities for state officials to insert
themselves or their families into the private ownership structure so as
to enrich themselves from the sale of state assets. Public officials
have two principal ways to help themselves. First, they help
themselves politically by doing business with companies headed by
potential political supporters. Second, they can directly benefit
themselves or their families by ensuring that some or much of the
revenue flows to them.
A recent investigation into the labyrinthine structure of the
oil industry in Equatorial Guinea illustrates the political dimensions
of the phenomenon. Equatorial Guinea is a small country in West
Africa sitting on substantial oil reserves and a well-deserved
reputation for corruption.52 People seeking to work in the oil industry
in that country actually work for sub-contractors, not the oil

51 See generally Pauline Jones Luong & Erika Weinthal, Rethinking the
Resource Curse: Ownership Structure, Institutional Capacity, and Domestic Constraints, 9
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 241 (2006) (discussing the state ownership of resources and its
effect on the resource curse). See id. at 259 (arguing that state ownership and state
control over natural resources significantly contributes to the resource curse).
52 See Equatorial Guinea: Country Outlook, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE
UNIT: COUNTRY VIEWSWIRE (Oct. 10, 2012), available at Gale Global Issues in
Context A305990653 (predicting a “difficult business environment” caused largely
because “corruption among public officials will remain rampant”).
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companies themselves.53 Because these subcontractors determine
who receives the most lucrative jobs in a desperately poor country,
they play a role with substantial economic and social importance. The
investigation of the industry found that some of the most powerful
employment agencies were owned by, among others, the president’s
brother (who was also a general in the Army), the president’s son
(who was also the Secretary of Mining and Energy), the president’s
uncle (who was also a general and Minister of Security), and the
president’s father-in-law (the former Minister of Mining).54 These
officials, operating through private companies doing business with
the state they represent, are the gateway through which anyone
seeking employment in the oil sector must pass. Decisions regarding
the sale of the country’s assets are made to ensure that those in
power remain in power. They are not made to facilitate broad-based
economic development.
The case of Angola illustrates the problem of direct personal
enrichment from the sale of state assets. Sonangol is the company
responsible for the exploitation of all of Angola’s substantial oil and
gas reserves.55 In this capacity, it manages all 40 of the onshore and
offshore concession blocks—the geographically defined areas in
which companies with a license are permitted to extract and sell oil.
Sonangol, acting on behalf of the state, sells the rights to exploit oil
and gas for each block to one or more companies in a kind of
auction. The result is that each of the 40 blocks has a different set of
owners, and all of the blocks are owned by multiple companies. For
example, block two is owned in shares by Petrobras, Chevron,
Somoil, Poliedro Oil Company, Kotoil, and a subsidiary of Sonangol

53 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WELL OILED: OIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN
EQUATORIAL
GUINEA
20
(2009),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bhr0709web_0.pdf.
54 Id.
55 See Petroleum Activities Law, No. 10/04 (2004) (Rep. of Angola),
http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/files/attachments/other/Angola%20Petroleu
m%20Activities%20Law,%202004.pdf. Under Angolan law, Sonangol is the sole
concessionaire for oil and gas exploration and exploitation rights, which means that
the company is the only entity with author to sell the state’s petroleum assets.
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itself.56 To be sure, the fact that blocks are owned in shares by
multiple owners is not itself indicative of wrongdoing. However, the
complex nature of the system leaves it vulnerable to abuse by officials
wishing to obscure their role in the transaction. In early 2012, the
former head of Sonangol, which is solely responsible for the
awarding of concession rights, disclosed that he had for years held an
ownership interest in a private company which had been involved in
a lucrative oil exploitation contract with the state. 57 Manuel Vincente,
the former head of Sonangol, disclosed that the head of the
president’s military police agency and the minister for state economic
cooperation also held stakes in the same company.
2. Opacity in national accounting
States with abundant natural resources and weak institutions
often provide little information about how much of the resource they
possess or how much they receive in payments for the resources they
sell. This problem takes multiple forms. First, some countries restrict
information and decision making authority to a small coterie of
individuals, often including relatives or close allies of government
officials who are charged with overseeing the industry. This means
that very few people, and no one outside the influence of top
officials, has information about the value of the resource being sold
or the revenue that has come into the country’s treasury. In Angola,
for example, auditors appointed by the International Monetary Fund
estimated that approximately 50% of the revenue that should have
been received under existing contracts had disappeared from the
national treasury.58 Even assuming the original contracts represented
fair value for the oil, the state could account for only half of the
revenue it was supposed to have received.
See
Sonangol
Oil
Concessions
Map,
SONANGOL
EP,
http://www.sonangol.co.ao/wps/portal/epNew/atividades/concessions/mapacon
cessoes (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
57 Tom Burgis & Cynthia O’Murchu, Angola Officials Held Hidden Oil
Stakes, FIN. TIMES, April 15, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/effd6a98854c-11e1-a394-00144feab49a.html#axzz2mQWSxpZw.
58 See Justin Pearce, IMF: Angola’s ‘Missing Millions,’ BBC, Oct. 18, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2338669.stm (reporting that the IMF found
nearly $1 billion had “disappeared” from the Angolan treasury in the previous
year).
56
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The problem of opacity manifests itself in other ways as well.
In Nigeria, government officials charged with negotiating oil and gas
exploitation leases regularly agreed to terms that were well below
market rates.59 In effect, officials sold Nigeria’s natural resources at
rates far below the amount those resources would have fetched if
sold in a transparent auction. This is a distinct harm from that
discussed above. In the previous example, the problem was that
revenue to which the state was contractually entitled did not actually
flow to the state; it was either stolen by corrupt officials, returned to
the oil companies, or not accounted properly accounted for. In this
instance, the problem is that the theft was built into the contract.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the report that identified the below-market
contracts also identified a number of instances in which the officials
who executed these contracts received large signature bonuses, which
were not disclosed or properly accounted for.60
When ExxonMobil was awarded a lease to extract oil from
three blocks off the coast of Nigeria, the company was required to
pay a “signature bonus” of approximately $600 million.61 In Angola,
when Sonangol negotiated the sale of lucrative oil blocks off the
coast of the country, it obtained a signature bonus of $10 million
from the companies awarded the contract.62 Signature bonuses are
payments made after an agreement is concluded but before any of the
natural resource is extracted. The size of the payment is determined
by the presumed value of the resource to be exploited, but the

59 Joe Brock, Exclusive: Nigeria Loses Billions in Cut Price Oil Deals,
REUTERS, Oct. 24, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/24/us-nigeriaoil-idUSBRE89N0VV20121024.
60 Id.
61 Tom Burgis, Groups to Dig Deep for Nigerian Leases, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 13,
2009,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/355075c0-e80d-11de-8a0200144feab49a.html#axzz2mQWSxpZw (reporting that ExxonMobil was required
to pay a signature bonus “of as much as $600m after securing a new 20-year lease
to three blocks”).
62 Tom Burgis & Cynthia O’Murchu, Spotlight Falls on Cobalt’s Angola
Partner, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1225e3de854d-11e1-a394-00144feab49a.html#axzz2rF7FuPQ7
(reporting
that
the
companies Nazaki Oil & Gaz and Cobalt International Energy had paid a signature
bonus to Sonangol as part of a deal to secure rights to exploit oil in offshore fields).
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payment must be made regardless of whether the project succeeds or
fails.63
As the law is currently interpreted, signature bonuses do not
violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the United Kingdom’s new
anti-bribery statute, or the OECD’s anti-corruption provisions.
Moreover, under the appropriate conditions, signature bonuses can
help to balance one of the challenges inherent in the sale of the right
to exploit natural resources. The state selling the resource wants as
much money as possible up front. The company buying the right to
exploit the resource wants to pay as little as possible until it is certain
of the quantity, quality, and marketability of the resource.64 Because it
is an upfront payment, the signature bonus is a potentially useful way
to account for the risks faced by each party.
The principal problem with signature bonuses is that, because
they are difficult to trace and account for, they can be used for
expenses that would be difficult to justify if subjected to public
scrutiny or robust political checks.65 For example, after officials in
Angola received a $900 million signature bonus from the sale of
several oil exploration licenses in 1999, officials apparently spent
much of the money on weaponry for use in the country’s civil war. 66
Again, it is not the fact of the bonuses that causes the problem.
See Peter Cramton, How Best to Auction Oil Rights, in ESCAPING THE
RESOURCE CURSE 114, 126 (Macartan Humphreys et al. eds., 2007),
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=cramton
(defining a signature bonus as an “upfront payment determined in auction for the
right to explore and develop the block during the license period”).
64 See, e.g., John McMillan, Promoting Transparency in Angola, 16 J.
DEMOCRACY 155, 159 (“[U]se of signature bonuses is not a sign of corruption; it is
sound auction design.”).
65 See Henri E. Cauvin, I.M.F. Skewers Corruption in Angola, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/30/world/imf-skewerscorruption-in-angola.html (reporting on leaked IMF report stating that at least $100
million in bonus payments were not entered in the country’s accounts). See also
Angola 2002 Article IV Consultation: Preliminary Conclusions of the IMF Mission, INT’L
MONETARY FUND (Feb. 19, 2002),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2002/021902.htm (urging Angola to include
in the national treasury account “the total amount of signature oil bonuses”).
66 Jedrzej George Frynas & Geoffrey Wood, Oil & War in Angola, 90
REV. OF AFR. POL. ECON. 587, 595 (2001).
63
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Instead the problem is the institutional failures that allow officials to
use the bonuses without meaningful scrutiny or accountability.
B. Internal Revenue Distribution
States rich in resource revenue must determine how to
distribute the revenue from the sale of resources. The most basic goal
is to turn a non-renewable resource into permanent improvement—
transforming today’s dollars into future development. But resource
wealth also raises many other distributional questions. How much
should be spent on people living near the extraction site and how
much on people living far from it? How much should be devoted to
the current generation and how much to future generations? How
much should be reinvested in the enterprise and how much extracted
to diversify the state’s financial portfolio? Weak institutions permit
officials to use resources inefficiently.
1. Investment in unnecessary or inefficient projects
Many resource-dependent economies make substantial
investments in infrastructure and the domestic economy, even in the
presence of corruption and mismanagement. In one survey of
resource dependent economies, the author found that investment
projects, along with the state payroll, represented one of the two
largest expenditures for the state.67 Thus, the problem is typically not
that the state is underinvesting in the domestic economy or in
infrastructure. The problem is that the state is making the wrong
kinds of investment decisions. Too often, politicians invest in
inefficient projects that on their face seem more designed to fail than
to succeed. In the field of development economics there is a small
but interesting literature on what are often called white elephants;
that is, expensive but unnecessary projects whose completion is
unlikely or would actually be socially harmful.68 Put somewhat more

Frankel, supra note 5, at 23.
The term “white elephant” apparently comes from a story told about
the kings of Siam. As the story goes, “the kings of Siam were accustomed to make
a present of one of the animals to courtiers who had rendered themselves
obnoxious in order to ruin the recipient by the cost of its maintenance.” OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 134 (2d ed., vol. V, 1989).
67
68
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formally, these are projects “with a negative social surplus.” 69 An
example from Nigeria illustrates the point. In the 1970s, the
government of Nigeria set out to build Africa’s largest steel plant, 70
but it was not fully operational as late as 2010.71 The problem
continues today. Consider a recent example from Ghana. In the leadup to the presidential elections in late 2012, the government used the
revenue from Chinese investment in the resource sector to finance a
number of major infrastructure projects that had little to commend
them other than their potential political payoff.72
White elephant projects are undertaken not because there is
convincing evidence that they will be socially useful or economically
efficient, but because they provide a payoff to the politicians who
champion them.73 For example, in Zambia, the government ordered
the construction of brick factories far from the places where
construction would take place, causing the cost of bricks to skyrocket
because of transportation costs. Contractors quickly stopped using
bricks and began to use concrete blocks. The brick factory was
eventually shuttered.74 Thus, the problem was not that the
government failed to invest in development projects—it had actually
invested heavily in the brick factory—or that the project itself was
without any value. Instead, the problem was that the institutions that

Robinson & Torvik, supra note 18 (developing a typology of white
elephant projects).
70 See NICHOLAS SHAXSON, POISONED WELLS: THE DIRTY POLITICS OF
AFRICAN OIL 22 (2007) (“[Nigeria’s leaders] spent recklessly: building a new
national capital in Abuja and pushing ahead with the giant Ajoakuta steel project, a
class of white elephant that was supposed to be Africa’s biggest steel plant yet
ended up consuming billions of dollars without producing any steel”).
71 Teresa Daban & Jean-Luc Helis, A Public Financial Management
Framework for Resource-Producing Countries 11 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/10/72,
2010) (“Ajoakuta steel mill built in the 1970s absorbed over US $3 billion yet is not
fully operational on a commercial basis”).
72 Political
Storm Over Chinese Gas Contracts, 6 AFRICA-ASIA
CONFIDENTIAL, Nov. 2012, http://www.africa-asia-confidential.com/articlepreview/id/823/Political_storm_over_Chinese_gas_contracts.
73 Robinson & Torvik, supra note 18, at 201 (arguing that white elephant
projects are undertaken because their “inefficiency” is particularly politically
beneficial to those who promote them).
74 Id.
69
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should have pushed the government to favor social welfare or longterm development over their own political gain failed to work.
2. Politically-motivated revenue distribution
In many developing countries, particularly those with
substantial natural resources, the number of public employees is far
greater than would otherwise be warranted. Many political leaders
have the power to increase or decrease public employment numbers
as they see fit. One extreme example is Kuwait. One recent study
found that 91 percent of the Kuwaiti labor force (that is, Kuwaiti
citizens) worked in the public sector.75 The problem of political
patronage is by no means limited to developing countries or those
rich with natural resources. Indeed, one study argued that many cities
in the United States use public employment as a way to distribute
wealth to politically favored groups.76 But the problem is pronounced
in developing countries,77 and it can have particularly bad
consequences in resource-rich countries.78 One reason politicians
hand out public sector jobs is that the practice can operate as a kind
of political insurance. That is to say, politicians can stay in office
longer if they distribute at least some of the revenue from resources
through public employment. For this to happen, two conditions must
be true. First, incumbent politicians must desire to remain in office.79
Second, citizens must have relatively few opportunities for
75 Laura El-Katiri, Bassam Fattouh & Paul Segal, Anatomy of an Oil-Based
Welfare State: Rent Distribution in Kuwait 19 (Kuwait Program on Dev., Governance,
and Globalization in the Gulf States, Research Paper No. 13, 2011) (noting that
91% of Kuwaiti nationals work in the public sector and that 98% of private sector
jobs are held by non-Kuwaitis).
76 See Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir & William Easterly, Redistributive Public
Employment (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6746, 1998).
77 See Alan Gelb et al., Public Sector Employment, Rent Seeking and Economic
Growth, 101 ECON. J. 1186 (1991) (showing that the size of public sector
employment relative to total non-agricultural employment was far higher in
developing countries than in industrialized countries).
78 See Karl, supra note 1, at 27 (describing the political benefits of
expanding the public payroll).
79 James A. Robinson et al., Political Foundations of the Resource Curse, 79 J.
DEV.
ECON.
447,
449
(2005),
http://www.feemweb.it/ess/ess07/files/bulte6_ln.pdf (modeling the behavior of politicians who
wish to be reelected or remain in power through other means).
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employment, a reality in developing countries by definition. Under
these conditions, politicians can distribute public sector jobs to
favored groups as a strategy to ensure that they remain in power.80
The harms from this activity can take a number of forms.
One harm is that it leads to a misallocation of human capital. A
rational worker is forced to choose between receiving his or her full
share of resource rents in the public sector and foregoing that share
in the private sector.81 A second harm is that the economy as a whole
may become inefficient because there are more workers than are
necessary and those workers face little incentive to work hard
because their jobs are virtually certain.82 As with the other problems
described above, it is institutional weakness that permits political
leaders to make self-serving decisions with little regard for social
welfare or long-term economic development.
III. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AS SUBSTITUTES FOR DOMESTIC
INSTITUTIONS
To this point I have argued that resource wealth can help or
hurt a country depending largely on the quality of its institutions. I
have also shown the kinds of institutional failures that lead to
harmful outcomes. These include permitting officials to monopolize
information about national assets and revenue, arrogate to
themselves dual business and public roles in resource transactions,
and distribute resource wealth capriciously. In this Part, I argue that
these domestic institutional failures can and should be addressed by
See RICHARD M. AUTY, RESOURCE ABUNDANCE AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 134 (2001) (arguing that patronage jobs are an efficient way to
distribute rents from resource revenue).
81 See Paul Segal, How to spend it: Resource wealth and the distribution of resource
rents,
51
ENERGY
POL’Y
340,
345
(2012),
http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/middleEastProgramme/kuwait/docu
ments/Segal.pdf (arguing that workers “face the following choice: be unproductive
in the public sector and be rewarded with oil rents, or be productive in the private
sector and not be rewarded with oil rents.”).
82 See id. (reporting on a study showing that Mexico’s state-owned oil
refineries “are among the least efficient in the world, partly because they employ six
times the number of people as US refineries of comparable size and complexity,
without higher levels of production.”).
80
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international institutions. Whether by design or happenstance,
international institutions already have a profound effect on the
domestic institutions of every state. There is an extensive literature
on this issue, with which I do not engage here except to note that
there is nothing particularly unusual about recognizing the domestic
effects of international law and institutions.83 What is new is the
attempt to develop more fully a theory of how and why international
institutions can and should serve some of the functions of domestic
institutions. To suggest that international law should operate as a
substitute for robust and effective domestic institutions is to
acknowledge at the outset the deep flaws present in the domestic
institutions of the states at issue. It is also to accept that international
institutions are inevitably imperfect and incomplete. Nonetheless,
concluding that international institutions are imperfect does not
undermine my argument that they can be a substitute for domestic
institutions under the right conditions.
The objective of this Part is two-fold: to demonstrate that my
approach is possible at a doctrinal level and to make the normative
case for the use of international institutions when domestic
institutions are inadequate. At the doctrinal level, I argue that the use
of international institutions is an appropriate and potentially useful
tool to address the resource curse in developing countries. I have
already discussed what I mean by institutions as a general matter, but
it bears explaining what I mean by “international institutions.” For
my purposes, the term “international institutions” is a broad
placeholder that means almost anything that is not a purely domestic
institution of the target country. The term “international institutions”
should be understood broadly to include both independent bodies
such as the United Nations, disaggregated groups, substantive rules,
and the like. Included in this would be measures that are created by
83 See generally BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009) (showing that, through the
lens of human rights, international norms and obligations—what I have labeled
international institutions—have had a profound effect on the human rights practices
of many countries). Simmons’s work is a kind of corrective to the arguments made
by some scholars and others that international norms have not had a profound
effect on the actions of states. See also Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties
Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002) (purporting to show that treaties do
not affect human rights practices of states).
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super-national bodies (or groups of states) such as the International
Criminal Court—an entity that exists apart from any particular state
with its own juridical personality and rules. My definition also
includes the substantive law the ICC applies. I also include national
statutes or regulations that are applied across borders. For example,
this can include the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which
regulates the conduct of U.S. corporations and those international
corporations trading on U.S. stock exchanges who do business
outside the U.S. The substantive rules and enforcement institutions
are not themselves international, but they reach across borders and
affect the substantive behavior of persons and entities outside the
U.S.84
Adopting such a broad definition means, of course, that there
are myriad entities, laws, and regulations that could fit my argument.
In this Part, my goal is to identify institutions that are plausible. That
is to say that the institutions I analyze can be used without radical
overhaul and are meant to show the mechanics of my proposal. I do
not argue that the set of institutions I have identified is the only, or
even the optimal, set of institutions for this purpose. Indeed, one of
the goals of this Article is to open a scholarly conversation on the use
of international institutions when domestic institutions fail to fulfill
their purpose. Thus my doctrinal objectives are largely illustrative.
I build the normative case on two blocks. I argue that states
owe positive obligations to their citizens, particularly with regard to
the use of non-renewable state-owned resources. When states or their
leaders use these resources for anything other than the benefit of
citizens, states have failed to fulfill important duties. Thus the first
normative building block is the notion of state obligation and
stewardship. Next I argue that, because international institutions are
already involved in the mechanics of the resource curse, the use of
international institutions to address the resource curse is entirely
appropriate. For example, state officials who pocket signature
bonuses move the money through the international banking system.
They rely on international corporations as joint venture partners to
For a full discussion of transnational law, including its international
and domestic dimensions and origins, see Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational
Law Matters, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 745, 745-47 (2006).
84
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exploit the resources that make them rich and on international
lenders to finance their vanity projects.
Before moving on, one caveat is in order. I have argued that
the reform of international institutions is a plausible second-best
approach to preventing or mitigating the effects of the resource
curse, but there is some evidence that international measures may be
a first-best approach, at least for some of the countries affected by
the resource curse. In some resource-rich countries, politicians can
reshape institutions to make it easier for them to capture as much of
the resource wealth as possible.85 There is significant debate about
how this might occur,86 but three possible explanations stand out.
First, governments with enough wealth can use the wealth to mollify
potential opponents or otherwise reduce domestic opposition.87
Second, governments with sufficient wealth might deliberately
interfere with the formation of opposition groups to ensure their
own survival.88 Finally, because political leaders enforce as well as
make the law, they can manipulate the enforcement of the law to
avoid the consequences of their own misdeeds.89 I do not attempt to
resolve this issue here, but it is nonetheless instructive to note that
See Michael L. Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy?, 53 WORLD POL. 325,
333-36 (2001) (arguing that state-controlled concentrated wealth can permit elites
and political leaders to modify existing institutions to insulate themselves from
accountability).
86 Indeed, there is debate about whether it occurs at all. See, e.g., Stephen
Haber & Victor Menaldo, Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of
the Resource Curse, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 3 (2011) (arguing that “increases in
natural resource income are associated with increases in democracy).
87 See, e.g., Ricky Lam & Leonard Wantchekon, Dictatorships as Political
Dutch Disease (Econ. Growth Ctr., Yale Univ., Working Paper No. 795, 1999), cited
in Ross, supra note 85, at 333.
88 See, e.g., NICHOLAS VAN DE WALLE, AFRICAN ECONOMIES AND THE
POLITICS OF PERMANENT CRISIS 1979-1999 (2001).
89 See, e.g., E. Woodrow Eckard, Are Autocratic Rules Also Inside Traders?
Cross-Country Evidence, 43 ECON. INQUIRY 13, 20 (2005) (arguing, based on
econometric analysis of 101 countries, that autocratic governments manipulate the
regulatory regime to create opportunities for political leaders to enrich themselves).
See also GREENPEACE, CONNING THE CONGO: LOGGING SECTOR REV. (2008),
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/planet2/report/2008/7/conning-the-congo.pdf
(documenting
manipulation
of
accounting and tax regulations to hide official profiteering).
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what I have labeled a second-best may well be first-best in some
circumstances.
The approaches outlined below fit into two broad categories
that are ordered roughly by the degree to which they would infringe
on the sovereignty of the target country. First, I argue that
international institutions can function as collectors and disseminators
of information that could be used by an informed and empowered
population to hold their leaders accountable. Information is a
necessary but certainly not sufficient ingredient in addressing the
resource curse. Citizens often simply do not know how much money
an oil company is paying for the oil it takes, who receives the money,
or how much the resource is truly worth. International institutions
often possess or could easily require or facilitate the disclosure of this
information.
Second, I argue that there are international institutions that
could be used to make access to markets and finance conditional on a
state’s compliance with certain norms or regulations. Put slightly
differently, states that refuse to disclose how much they receive from
oil companies should not be permitted to sell their products using
international markets or should be ineligible for participation in
international lending or insurance regimes. This approach represents
a greater intrusion on the target state’s sovereignty because the state
would be required to change its behavior or face exclusion from
external sources of finance or markets. Nonetheless, the behavioral
change is minimal because it merely requires compliance with existing
norms or regulations. It is already a violation of international norms
for government officials to personally benefit from the sale of state
assets or for a state treasury to fail to record payments for the sale of
state assets.
A. The Uses of Information
Perhaps the least intrusive international response would be to
require entities involved in transactions to gather and disseminate
information about their activities. Scholars and policymakers have
long argued that transparency can be a useful tool in the fight against
official corruption, regardless of whether the country is affected by

246

2014

Keenan

3:1

the resource curse.90 Entities from the International Monetary Fund
to the World Bank to Transparency International have long called for
more transparency as a way to fight corruption.91 My general
approach is therefore not unique. What is different is my argument
that international institutions can play an important role in the
process.
Most theories about the utility of transparency focus on the
causal pathways by which transparency might reduce corruption. One
prominent argument is that officials are less likely to engage in
corrupt behavior when there is a greater likelihood that they will be
found out.92 One strand of this argument is that officials will be
deterred if they fear their reputations will suffer if they are exposed as
corrupt.93 Another strand holds that transparency works because
officials are more likely to be caught by law enforcement, and if
caught, proof of their crimes will be more readily available.94
Regardless of which of these approaches is correct, transparency is
likely to work only when the information ends up in the hands of an
entity (or population) with the power to hold corrupt leaders
accountable.95 For this to happen, those who receive the information
90 For a thorough discussion of the causes and consequences of
corruption, including analysis of the uses of transparency, see SUSAN ROSEACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND
REFORM (1999) and SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN
POLITICAL ECONOMY (1978).
91 See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Redesigning the State to Fight Corruption:
Transparency, Competition, and Privatization, Note No. 75, PUB. POL’Y PRIVATE
SECTOR
(April
1996),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/11627/multi0pag
e.pdf?sequence=1 (summarizing best practices with respect to reducing
corruption).
92 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 91.
93 See, e.g., Gerald Anselm Acquaah-Gaisie, Curbing Financial Crime Among
Third World Elites, 8 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 371, 377 (2005) (arguing
that the “fear of exposure can act as a deterrent” to official misconduct).
94 See Ivar Kolstad & Arne Wiig, Is Transparency the Key to Reducing
Corruption in Resource-Rich Countries?, 37 WORLD DEV. 521, 523 (2009) (arguing that
under “non-transparent circumstances proof is more difficult to generate and
corrupt officials are able to buy their way out of punishment”).
95 See, e.g., McMillan, supra note 64, at 161-66 (describing the ways
policymakers and citizens used information about official corruption and oil
revenue in Angola to push for reforms).
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must have the capacity to process it and have the means to affect the
behavior of those engaging in corrupt behavior.96
At the doctrinal level, what matters is to identify how and
where information can be obtained and disclosed.97 I highlight two
approaches: disclosure of information about financial movement and
transactions, and disclosure of substantive information about a
company’s supply chain or other business practices.
It is almost impossible to move money around the world
without leaving at least some trace.98 That commercial and financial
transactions leave a trail is neither new nor particularly noteworthy in
the context of law enforcement or those seeking civil redress or the
enforcement of contracts. In most instances, this trail consists of the
information gathered by entities that facilitate or regulate such
transactions, including banks, regulatory agencies, securities

96 See Kolstad & Wiig, supra note 96, at 529 (arguing that the “impact of
transparency therefore depends on the level of education of an electorate, the
extent to which key stakeholders have the power to hold a government to account,
and the private or collective nature of the goods about which information is
provided”).
97 There have been attempts to harness information in similar ways. For
example, the conflict minerals provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act are an attempt to do this. For a full treatment of this
issue, see generally Christiana Ochoa & Patrick J. Keenan, Regulating Information
Flows, Regulating Conflict: An Analysis of United States Conflict Minerals Legislation, 3
GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 129 (2011). Similarly, the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative attempts to harness the power of information to modify the
conduct of corporations and governments. See generally Clare Short, The Development
of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 7 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 8
(2013).
98 See, e.g., Caterina Giannetti & Nicola Jentzsch, Credit Reporting, Financial
Intermediation and Identification Systems: International Evidence, 33 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN.
60, 64 (2013) (describing various international regulations regarding the obligations
of financial institutions to verify the identity of those using the financial system).
But see NICHOLAS SHAXSON, TREASURE ISLANDS: UNCOVERING THE DAMAGE OF
OFFSHORE BANKING AND TAX HAVENS (2011) (describing the many ways that
participants in the financial system can obscure or hide their transactions).
Nonetheless, my point is not that the system is perfect. Instead, I argue that there is
information available that could be used for the purposes I describe.
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exchanges, and the like.99 This financial trail is perhaps best thought
of not as a uniform, unbroken line but as a pointillist representation
of a line: a series of discrete points, which take on the shape of a line
only when viewed together. Each point might represent the arrival of
money in a bank or the registration of a securities transaction with a
regulatory or trading house. Regardless of what they are, most of the
points exist through the compulsion, either direct or indirect, of the
law. Regulatory bodies gather information using legal tools. Trading
houses do the same. Institutions that ostensibly operate privately—
such as banks—are nonetheless subject to investor protection
regulations and other laws that compel them to gather information.
Each point in the series is both an example of the law of that
jurisdiction regulating the conduct of a non-citizen and an
opportunity to gather or obscure information. Both of these issues
are relevant to my argument. Recent efforts to recover the proceeds
of corruption illustrate the potential of using bits of information
gathered from seemingly disparate sources. Using information
gathered from financial regulators, customs houses, corporations, and
international institutions, litigants have been able to recover some of
the money stolen by Frederick Chiluba, the former president of
Zambia, and his associates.100
Recent legislation in the United States illustrates the second
model: requiring entities to assemble and disclose information about
their own operations.101 As part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),102 the U.S.
99 See generally Jackie Johnson, Is the Global Financial System AML/CFT
Prepared?, 15 J. FIN. CRIME 7 (2008) (describing information gathering requirements
imposed by financial regulators after Sept. 11, 2001 to promote anti-money
laundering and countering the financing of terrorism and finding that significant
work remains to be done despite the improvements in tracing funds).
100 See Jeffrey Simser, Asset Recovery and Kleptocracy, 17 J. FIN. CRIME 321,
322-23 (2011) (describing the history of efforts to recover funds stolen by Chiluba
between 1991 and 2001).
101 For a more extensive treatment of this issue, see Christiana Ochoa &
Patrick J. Keenan, Regulating Information Flows, Regulating Conflict: An Analysis of United
States Conflict Minerals Legislation, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 129, 137-41 (2011)
(arguing that requiring companies to assemble and disclose information was a
means to promote transparency and reduce corruption).
102 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R.
4173.ENR, § 1502, Conflict Minerals.
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Congress included provisions designed to address the ongoing
conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The conflict minerals
provisions, and the regulations that implement them, require
manufacturers to determine whether there are any materials
“necessary to the functionality or production of a product”103 which
they manufacture that originate in the DRC or any country with
which it “shares an internationally recognized border.” 104
Importantly, these provisions do not prohibit the use or sale of
conflict minerals. Instead they require companies to gather
information about their practices and disclose this information to
regulators and the public. Thus the use of U.S. markets is
conditioned on the disclosure of information about the participant’s
financial practices.
I argue that international institutions are a plausible secondbest approach, but there is some evidence that, with respect to
transparency, they may be more effective than domestic institutions.
Broadly speaking, transparency can occur in two ways: through
mechanisms controlled by the targeted actor or through mechanisms
outside of that actor’s control. For example, freedom-of-information
laws are controlled by the source of the information. A free press is
outside the control of the source of the information.105 In an
empirical analysis of transparency reforms, scholars found that the
transparency measures under the control of the source of
information are less effective at reducing corruption than similar
measures that are outside the control of the source.106 This suggests
that transparency measures under the control of international
institutions (and independent from domestic actors) may be more
effective than purely domestic measures.

Id. at § 1502(2)(B).
Id. at § 1502(e)(1).
105 See Catharina Lindstedt & Daniel Naurin, Transparency Is Not Enough:
Making Transparency Effective in Reducing Corruption, 31 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 301, 305
(2010) (arguing that “who controls the release of information” is an important
variable in determining the efficacy of transparency as an anti-corruption tool).
106 Id. at 316.
103
104
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B. Conditional Access to Markets
One way to address the problem would be to be recognize
and capitalize on the conditional nature of access to markets and
financial systems. The international financial system is not an entity
unto itself; it is made up of many connected networks, each of which
is governed by the national law of one or more states. Access to the
financial system is conditional in every case. Firms that wish to raise
capital on U.S. exchanges are permitted to do so only if they comply
with certain regulations. Firms that wish to raise capital in the City of
London must comply with U.K regulations.107 For example, in the
United States the Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”) plays
this role. OFAC is a part of the U.S. Department of the Treasury that
enforces trade and economic sanctions involving foreign individuals
and groups believed to be involved in various kinds of illegal
activities.108 Because OFAC is an enforcement mechanism—it
executes presidential directives or statutory requirements—the
analogy is not perfect, but it is instructive nonetheless. OFAC
identifies individuals who, by their actions or position, are considered
to be ineligible to do business in the United States or use the U.S.
financial system in their dealings. Similarly, access to U.S. consumer
markets is conditional. Companies whose products are made with
forced labor, for example, are prohibited from selling their products
in the U.S. What I propose is to expand the categories of persons
who would be subject to heightened scrutiny or outright prohibitions
on access to markets. What follows are examples of and justifications
for the kinds of categories I propose.
1. Prohibit dual roles in transactions
Politicians often enrich themselves by participating in the
same project as both private citizens looking to make money and
107 See, e.g., Peter Johnstone & George Brown, International Controls of
Corruption: Recent Responses from the USA and the UK, 11 J. FIN. CRIME 217, 219-25
(2004) (describing various regulatory and statutory obligations of those using the
U.S. and U.K. capital markets).
108 See Mission of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-ofForeign-Assets-Control.aspx (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
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public officials charged with pursuing the public good. Consider
again the example from Angola. In his official role, Manuel Vicente
was head of Sonangol, the Angolan national oil company. In this
capacity he was charged with constructing the best possible
arrangement for Angola to exploit its vast oil reserves. In this role he
was selling an asset owned by the country with the goal of
transforming oil into long-term development. In his private capacity,
he had a stake in one of the companies purchasing the very same
state-owned asset he was selling in his official capacity.109 In
Equatorial Guinea, public officials, who were close relatives of the
president, were, in their private capacities, owners of companies that
contracted with the state oil company.110
The phenomenon of public officials using official positions
for personal gain is not unheard of in wealthy Western countries.111
But the problem is particularly troublesome in resource-rich
developing countries.112 The principal check on this kind of official
behavior is political. Politicians who abuse their public positions can
simply be voted out or otherwise removed from office. This check
works only with an informed, empowered electorate, which is absent
in most developing countries suffering from the resource curse. In
Angola, most citizens do not have the information to hold official
accountable, and even if they did there are few opportunities for
them to do so.

See Tom Burgis et al., Interactive: Angolan Oil Connections, FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/03293b62-84c4-11e1-a3c500144feab49a.html#axzz2rjxc08vT. Vicente had a private stake in a company
named Aquattro, which was a shareholder in Nazaki, which was one of four
companies that purchased the right to exploit the oil in blocks 9 and 21.
110 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53, at 20.
111 See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Political Corruption and Democratic
Structures, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION 25, 35-40 (Arvind K. Jain
ed., 2001) (describing and measuring corruption in advanced democracies).
112 See, e.g., Hazel M. McFerson, Extractive Industries and African Democracy:
Can the “Resource Curse” be Exorcised?, 11 INT’L STUD. PERSP. 335, 340-41 (2010)
(using various quantitative indicators to demonstrate high levels of corruption in
resource-rich developing countries).
109
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2. Reduce patronage opportunities
One of the causal pathways by which the resource curse
affects poor countries is that politicians engage in patronage. That is,
they use their official positions to reward supporters by providing
civil service jobs or investing in politically useful but socially
inefficient projects. To mitigate this effect, it would be useful to
reduce opportunities for politicians to directly distribute public
benefits in a way that accrues to their benefit. This could be
accomplished by reducing the decisional authority of individuals and
restricting spending choices.
Perversely, international institutions seem to encourage, or at
least facilitate, this behavior. Consider the ways that international
institutions encourage or require corporations and countries to
interact. It is considered an international best practice for companies
and countries to engage in what are often called multi-stakeholder
dialogues. These are opportunities for identified stakeholders—those
affected by a resource extraction project, for example—to negotiate
the contours of the project. There is something intuitively appealing
about requiring a large corporation to sit down with community
leaders before beginning a project that will affect the community.
And there is some evidence that these dialogues can make projects
more efficient and reduce their social costs. The problem comes
when the government names the stakeholders and designates the
local businesses or leaders who will participate in the process.113 This
is a perfect patronage opportunity: in exchange for a seat at the
bargaining table or a share of the proceeds, local leaders might
reward the politicians who nominate them with political loyalty or
with acquiescence in an inefficient or even harmful project.
Domestic institutional failures make this possible. Patronage
and other types of abuse are more likely to occur when the control of
a complex transaction is vested in a very small handful of officials
who play multiple roles in the transaction. This is a distinct problem
See, e.g., Ivar Kolstad & Tina Soreide, Corruption in Natural Resource
Management: Implications for Policymakers, 34 RES. POL’Y 214, 218 (2009) (describing
the ways that politicians can manipulate multi-stakeholder dialogue process for
political advantage).
113
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from the dual public/private issue discussed separately. One way this
issue comes about is that officials who are charged with determining
the optimal process by which to exploit resources are the same
officials who are charged with assessing the success or failure of the
project. Put slightly differently, those charged with maximizing
returns are also given the authority to monitor how well they are
doing their job. A second way the issue comes about is that officials
who are charged with selling state assets also run the auctions at
which those assets are sold.
The harms are similar in both instances. The problem of dual
roles—even when both are ostensibly for the benefit of the public—
makes self-serving behavior possible and therefore more likely.
Consider an example. Chad and Cameroon signed an agreement to
extract oil in Chad and transport it through a pipeline in Cameroon
for sale on the international markets.114 Officials in Cameroon had to
determine how to compensate the communities affected by the
pipeline and attendant activity. Those same officials were charged
with determining how well the original plan worked, including
seeking information from those affected, hearing complaints from
citizens, and assessing the environmental impacts of the project.
These officials were, in effect, grading themselves. There was little
incentive for critical assessment of the initial plan or for identification
of corrective measures for problems that arose.
The second, and perhaps more significant problem, has to do
with information. As discussed separately, mechanisms that require
the production of information that can be used by citizens or other
interested parties to hold the government accountable are an
important tool. When officials are charged with monitoring
themselves, they have no incentive to produce or disseminate
information, particularly information critical of their own conduct.
One way to address these concerns is to provide a place at the table
in any investment dispute for people who are not directly involved in

See generally Scott Pegg, Can a Policy Intervention Beat the Resource Curse?
Evidence from the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project, 105 AFR. AFF. 1 (2005) (describing the
legal and policy apparatus created to address potential revenue distribution
problems in the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project).
114
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the transaction but who represent the true owners of the asset for
sale.
C. Complications and Objections
The claim that international institutions can operate as
substitutes for domestic institutions is open to a number of
objections, two of which I address here. The first is that taking my
approach seriously would undermine the sovereignty of resource-rich
states. The second objection is that, because institutional failures
occur everywhere, not simply in resource-rich countries, and
international institutions are far from perfect themselves, there is not
sufficient justification to substitute international institutions for
domestic institutions.
1. Sovereignty
The first and most important objection is that my argument is
nothing more than neo-colonialism under a different name because it
advocates foreign intrusion into what should be purely domestic
concerns. The concept of sovereignty is both a foundational concept
of international law and affairs and an idea subject to varied and
changing definition. For my purposes, sovereignty is the principle
that there is a sphere of domestic authority into which external forces
may not interfere without permission.115 The protected domain was
never absolute,116 and it is even more difficult to define in light of the
development of human rights law.117 But even if contours of
sovereignty are not susceptible to precise definition, the core concept
remains important: countries expect to have unchallenged authority
See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY
20 (1999) (defining various strands of sovereignty, including Westphalian
sovereignty: “the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures”).
116 See Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and
International Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959, 962 (2000) (reviewing STEPHEN D.
KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999)) (describing the history
of variations in state control and claims of authority over territory).
117 See generally W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in
Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866 (1990) (arguing that the advent
of universal human rights norms has modified traditional conceptions of
sovereignty).
115
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over their domestic affairs, including the use of natural resources
found in their territory. My argument does intrude on this domain. I
argue that international institutions should be used, for example, to
require states to make substantively different decisions with regard to
how they distribute the revenue from the sale of state assets. Instead
of spending state revenue on building a new soccer stadium, the state
would be required to invest in ways with a greater likelihood to
improve the welfare of citizens. In this way, my argument, and the
objections to it, bears some resemblance to the arguments over the
attachment of conditions to development assistance. In the 1980s
and 1990s, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank,
among other international financial institutions, sought to promote
economic policy reform based on what was called the “Washington
Consensus.”118 To accomplish these policy objectives, the
International Monetary Fund required countries wishing to avail
themselves of the IMF’s resources to adopt reforms in line with the
Washington Consensus.119 One objection to the practice of
conditionality was that it intruded on the sovereignty of the recipient
states.120 Put another way, the problem was that the policies required
by international financial institutions were those which should have
been the prerogative of the recipient country, not an international
institution.
The sovereignty issue is important but it does not defeat my
argument. I do not attempt to arrive at a theory of optimal social

118 The set of policy prescriptions comprising the Washington Consensus
was first assembled in an article by John Williamson in What Washington Means by
Policy Reforms, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED
(John Williamson ed., 1990).
119 See, e.g., Daniel D. Bradlow, The World Bank, the IMF, and Human
Rights, 6 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 49, 50 (arguing that “the IMF is able
to exert greater influence over those Member States who need or expect to need its
financial assistance” by converting “advice” into “conditionalities attached to IMF
financing”); Moises Naim, Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion?, 118
FOREIGN POL’Y 86, 90 (2000) (describing the ways the IMF and the World Bank
required countries to adopt the Washington Consensus reforms as a condition of
receiving development or financial assistance).
120 See, e.g., Douglas Zormelo, Is Aid Conditionality Consistent with National
Sovereignty? (Overseas Dev. Inst., Working Paper 95, 1997) (surveying the
sovereignty-based arguments regarding aid conditionality).
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investment.121 Instead my goal is to identify ways to set broad
boundaries outside of which countries should not go with respect to
how they spend state assets. Conditions on wealth transfers,
including resource extraction contracts, are ubiquitous.122 It is
instructive to note that, in the end, the Washington Consensus
collapsed not because of the sovereignty objection, but because it
failed to achieve its stated objectives.123 Conditions are a mechanism
by which owners of a resource—in this case, the citizens who
ultimately own oil or minerals or the like—can affect the behavior of
those who wish to use those resources. Lenders do not just give away
money for any purpose; instead they inquire about the purpose and
incorporate ways to discipline recipients if they use the money for
improper purposes. Similarly, I argue that when international
institutions are involved in any way in a resource extraction
transaction, they are providing a benefit for which they can
appropriately request something in return.
Related to this is a second response. International institutions
are already associated with every resource extraction transaction. I
argue that these institutions amount to tools necessary for the
execution of resource extraction transactions. Participants include
corporations registered and regulated in the U.S. and around the
world, financial institutions whose accounts are used to transfer
funds, and courts and other dispute resolution institutions used to
enforce contracts in the event of a dispute.124 My argument is that
121 There is no shortage of attempts to develop such a program using
revenue generated from resources. See generally MINERAL RENTS AND THE
FINANCING OF SOCIAL POLICY: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES (Katja Hujo
ed., 2012). In her concluding article, Katja Hujo summarizes the various ways that
development schemes financed by resource wealth can negatively affect a country
and the policy interventions best capable of preventing these harms. Id. at 318-31.
122 In previous work I showed the prevalence of conditions on wealth
transfers, including development assistance, foreign direct investment, and resource
extraction contracts. See Patrick J. Keenan, Curse or Cure? China, Africa, and the Effects
of Unconditioned Wealth, 27 BERKELEY J. INTL. L. 84, 110-17 (2009).
123 See generally Dani Rodrik, Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington
Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a
Decade of Reform, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 973 (2006) (surveying the evidence of
reform failures and analyzing possible reforms).
124 See, e.g., Timothy L. O’Brien, At Riggs Bank, a Tangled Path Led to
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/19/us/at-
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these institutions should use their involvement to benefit local people
and avoid permitting others to use them to do harm.
2. The Fallibility of International Institutions
The next objection is actually a cluster of related points.
Some argue that there is nothing magical about what I have called
international institutions. Recall that my definition includes
institutions in one country that regulate or otherwise affect the
behavior of actors in other countries. The objection would be that
institutions do not function perfectly in any country, and even robust
institutions are subject to capture by interest groups, incompetence,
and weakness in the face of political pressure or particularly
sophisticated schemes to avoid regulation or to defraud. I do not
argue is not that international institutions are a panacea for every ill.
Instead, I contend that weak domestic institutions provide
opportunities for unaccountable political leaders to enrich
themselves, and that this enrichment harms the citizens of the
country. International institutions are not a panacea, but do have a
role to play in mitigating these harms.
A second strand of this objection would be that international
institutions have a poor track record with respect to developing
countries.125 There is undoubtedly evidence to support this objection,
but the fact that past efforts have not worked is not, standing alone,
sufficient reason to abandon any attempt at reform. I do not argue
that international institutions are, in a first-best world, preferable to
robust domestic institutions. Instead, I argue that international
institutions, particularly legal institutions, are a workable second-best
option that might mitigate the harms caused by domestic institutions.
Citizens in poor countries plagued by corrupt leadership are unlikely
riggs-bank-a-tangled-path-led-to-scandal.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (describing
the involvement of Riggs Bank in laundering money for corrupt foreign dictators
including Augusto Pinochet and Teodoro Obiang).
125 For a thorough treatment of the history of foreign assistance failures,
see WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST’S EFFORTS
TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND SO LITTLE GOOD (2006).
Easterly argues that attempts by international institutions such as the IMF and the
World Bank to aid poor countries and encourage them to adopt pro-growth
policies have done much more harm than good.
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to object to international regulations that make their leaders more
accountable and less likely to enrich themselves by impoverishing the
country. Over the long run the locus of institutional control matters:
external regulation might undermine internal efforts to develop
strong regulatory institutions. But in the short to medium term,
citizens, particularly the poorest citizens, surely are less concerned
about the locus of institutional control than they are about having
opportunities to better themselves.126
The final strand is that the kinds of institutional failure I have
described occur in every country to at least some extent. These
phenomena are not unique to developing countries, resourcedependent economies, or any other narrow group of countries.127 It is
important to recognize that even if there is not a difference in kind
among countries with respect to the types of institutional weaknesses
that I describe, there is a difference in degree. There is ample
evidence that many developing countries, particularly those rich in
natural resources, have a higher incidence of corruption, less
transparent and less effective corporate governance, and a greater
centralization of control over the business and technical aspects of
resource exploitation. My focus is on those states in which the
available evidence suggests that weak domestic institutions are
subject to exploitation that significantly affects citizens who are
already struggling.

126 This is a version of an argument I made in an earlier article. See Patrick
J. Keenan, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Social Arrears: Should Debts to Citizens be Treated
Differently than Debts to Other Creditors?, 49 VA. J. INTL. L. 431, 453-64 (2009).There I
developed a theory of what states owe their citizens and specified the sources and
contours of these obligations.
127 See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in
CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 31 (Kimberly Ann Elliot ed., 1996)
(surveying the causes and consequences of corruption in countries around the
world); Kenneth J. Meier & Thomas M. Holbrook, “I Seen My Opportunities and I
Took ‘Em:” Political Corruption in the American States, 54 J. POL. 135 (1992) (analyzing
the scope of and explanations for corruption in the United States); James C. Scott,
Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1142 (1969)
(showing the effects of systems of political patronage on governance in the United
States).
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CONCLUSION
The conclusion that the resource curse is caused in large part
by weak domestic institutions represents a significant advance in the
literature on economic development. At first glance the solution
seems to follow from the problem: address the resource curse by
fixing domestic institutions. But when that is not possible or is likely
to be a slow process, there are good reasons to use international
institutions to do some of the work of domestic institutions, at least
in the short and medium terms. Particularly with respect to legal
institutions, there are a number of ways to apply insights from the
development economics literature to mitigate the effects of the
resource curse and allow citizens of poor countries to reap more of
the benefits of the countries’ wealth.
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